GOVERNING THE
STATE STATUTES
CANCELLATION OF AUTOMOBILE

INSURANCE
Recent criticism of automobile liability insurancepractices,
in particularthe cancellation of policies, led to the enactment
of federal legislation authorizing the Secretary of
Transportation to conduct a two year comprehensive study of
that industry. Such a study may well recommend federal
regulation of automobile insurance in a sharp break with the
tradition of state regulation. The states, however, have not
been entirely unresponsive and several have recently enacted
restrictive statutes aimed at correcting the problems raised by
cancellation practices. The present comment is a survey,
grouping, and analysis of the major types of state legislation
addressing the problem of cancellation and presents
recommended steps which could be taken to correct the
weaknesses of such statutes.

T

of automobile accidents as a national safety
problem of the first magnitude has been paralleled by the growth
of state regulation of automobile insurance.! Such regulation,
operating within the limits of the fault liability system, 2 has been
designed primarily to provide a solvent defendant from whom an
injured victim might seek compensation. Thus, Financial
Responsibility and Compulsory Insurance Laws, the typical means
of assuring solvency, envisage insurance covering the driver who is
likely to cause an accident? The obligations placed upon insurers
by the legislation and the economics of automobile insurance force
insurance companies into competition to insure the greatest number
of drivers who present the least risk to the insurer As a result of
such pressures, insurers have perhaps been more ready to cancel or
HE EMERGENCE

For an early depiction of the scope of the problem and legislative responses, see C.
SUNDERLIN, AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE §§ 1-13 (1929).
2See R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM (1965).
3See notes 24 & 25 infra and accompanying text.
4See Hearings on H.J. Res. 958 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce and Finance of the
House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 31-32, 37 '(1968)
[hereinafter cited as Hearings];CRISIS IN CAR INSURANCE 232, 255, 262, 266 (R. Keeton, J.
O'Connell & J. McCord ed. 1968).
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fail to renew a policy than would be the case absent such
legislation. Regardless of the validity of this idea, popular attitudes
apparently have developed which generally accept such allegations as well as the assertion that state regulation has been unable to
deal with the problem5
Traditionally, the states had regulated the insurance business
and were thought to possess sole competence in the area' until

1944, when federal regulation was upheld in the Southeastern
Underwriters case However, the McCarran-Ferguson Act,8 passed
in response to that decision," adopted the philosophy of state

regulation and prevented any federal encroachment into the field of
insurance regulation by legislation other than that specifically

intended to do so. t0 The recent upsurge of criticism of automobile
liability insurance, however, seems to threaten this philosophy.
Apparently in response to this wave of criticism,"' Congress enacted
legislation in May, 1968 to authorize the Secretary of
Transportation to conduct a comprehensive investigation of the
5 See generally TIME, July 19, 1968 at 65-66; U.S. NEWS & WORLD
1968, at 102-14. See also 1966-2 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL

REPORT, Feb. 26,
ASSOCIATION OF

INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS 510-513.

6 Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868). An 1866 Act of the Virginia Legislature
provided that foreign insurance companies must obtain a license and deposit a bond in order
to conduct business within the State. A subsequent act provided that no person may act as
an agent for an unlicensed foreign insurer. Samuel Paul undertook to act as an insurance
agent in violation of these acts and was fined in State court.
Paul argued that the Virginia statute was state regulation of interstate commerce which
encroached upon an area of exclusive federal jurisdiction under the commerce clause. 75 U.S.
(8 Wall.) at 173-74. The Supreme Court, per Field, J., held that insurance contracts were not
interstate transactions but simply contracts which, becoming effective only upon delivery
within the state, were solely local transactions and subject to local, not federal, law. 75 U.S.
(8 Wall.) at 183-85. Cf. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Cravens, 178 U.S. 389 (1900); Metropolitan
Cas. Ins. Co. v. Brownell, 68 F.2d 481, 482 (7th Cir. 1934).
7 United States v. Southeastern Underwriters, 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
I15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1964).
'See H.R. REP. No. 143, 79th Cong., Ist Sess. (1945); 1945 U.S. CODE CONG. SERV. 670
(now U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS).
11"No Act of Congress shall be construed

to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law
enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance . . . unless such
Act specifically relates to the business of insurance .....
15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1964)
(emphasis added).
1 See generally Hearings, supra note 4. See also note 5 supra. A good part of the criticism
of present insurance practices is somewhat unfair in failing to note that these practices are
the result of the fault liability system which places the insurer and the injured accident victim
in the role of adversaries.
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existing compensation system for motor vehicle accident losses. 2

Legislative history makes it clear that one of the primary concerns
of the two-year study will be the automobile liability insurance
business.' 3 The hearings indicate that Congress is receptive to the

idea of bringing the insurance industry under federal regulation,
despite the dictates of the 1944 McCarran-Ferguson Act."

Testimony before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce revealed concern with virtually

every phase of automobile insurance. The greatest concern was
evidenced in regard to cancellation practices prevailing in the
industry, numerous congressmen indicating that they commonly

received complaints about arbitrary cancellations. 5 Closely allied
concerns were blanket area cancellations and possible

discriminatory action by insurers against elderly, young and

6
minority group drivers.1
Although Congress chose to await the results of the study

rather than to legislate in 1968, some legislative response to the
study and the recommendations of the Secretary of Transportation

is to be anticipated in 1970. However, it should be noted that the
states have not been unaware of the problems of cancellation.
Recent legislative activity indicates state awareness of the problems
and an effort to control them. 17 While testimony before the

Subcommittee revealed considerable support for immediate federal
regulation of the area,' 8 it would seem that an examination of
Il

82 Stat. 126 (1968) (1968 U.S.

CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS

154).

'=See generally Hearings. supra note 4; 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1937 el seq.

, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1964); see notes 7-8 supra and accompanying text.
"Hearings. supra note 4, at 11,29, 68, 69.
16 Such problems are subject to treatment within the broader context of cancellations in
general and will not be treqted specifically herein. These problems have been recognized by
the states and some remedial action has been taken. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-310.2
(Supp. 1967), which provides that insurers may not discriminate against aged people. See
also 1967-1 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS

179-80.

"7See, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE §§ 651-53, 660-69 (West Supp. 1968); KAN.
§ 40-276 et seq. (Supp. 1968); N.Y. INS. LAW § 167a (MeKinney Supp. 1968);
CODE ANN. § 48.18.294 (Supp. 1968).

STAT. ANN.
WASH. REV.

'1See Hearings.supra note 4, at II (Hon. George M. Rhodes, Congressman, Pa.), 13 (Hon.
Leonard Farbstein, Congressman, N.Y.), 34-38 (Kenneth Meiklejohn, Legislative
Representative, AFL-CIO), 70 (Hon. Joshua Eilberg, Congressman, Pa.), 71 (Hon. George
P. Miller, Congressman, Cal.), 75 (Hon. William T. Cahill, Congressman, N.J.). See also
1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1949-50 (Hon. Richard Ottinger, Congressman, N.Y.).
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present state regulatory efforts should be a prerequisite to changing
the long-standing philosophy of state regulation. Much of the state
legislative activity occurred only recently,"9 and its effects have not
yet been considered by the courts, nor are they likely to be so
considered before the termination of the authorized study. An
inquiry into the status of state r6gulatory efforts is therefore
worthwhile, as a benchmark for possible future federal legislation.
This comment will survey, classify and analyze the various state
statutory approaches to the problem of automobile liability
insurance cancellation. Because cancellation by the insurer is the
primary concern of critics, congressmen, and presumably insured
parties,2 0 the statutes are examined from that standpoint
exclusively.
FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY STATUTES

Although legislation recently enacted in some states undertakes
to restrict severely the ability of insurers to cancel automobile
liability insurance policies,2 ' many states have no restrictions upon
the insurer's ability to cancel, and the matter of cancellation is
regarded as one of contract between the partiesP Although there is
some degree of official concern in these states with the status of
existing liability insurance policies, such concern is usually
manifested within the confines of the local Safety or Financial
Responsibility Law and is directed not at preventing arbitrary
cancellations but toward insuring that traffic accident victims will
have a solvent defendant to sueP
" See note 17 supra.
20 At least one state has determined that the public interest requires insured policy-holders
to meet some strict notice requirements before insured-initiated cancellation becomes
effective. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch. 175, § 113A (1959).
2! See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
2See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 36, § 74(42) -(83) (1958); ALASKA STAT. § 28.20.010 -640
(1962); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-7-1 to 39 (1963); CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 14-113 to
133 (1958); HAWAI REV. LAWS §§ 80-126 (1955); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 49-1501 to 1540
(1967); IOWA CODE §§ 321A.1 -.39 (1966); Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 187.290 -.990 (1962); Mo.
REV. STAT. §§ 303.010 -.370 (1959); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 53-418 to 458 (1961);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4509.1 -99 (Page 1965); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, §§ 7-101 to 505
(1962); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6701(h) (1960).
mSee, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 28.20.010 (1962); CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 14-112 (1958);
Mo. REV. STAT. § 303.070 (1959); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20.279.1(11) (Supp. 1967). See
generally Legislation, A Suryey of Financial Responsibility Laws and Compensation of
Traffic Victims: A Proposalfor Reform, 21 VAND. L. REv. 1058 (1968).
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rypically, the Financial Responsibility statutes provide that
certain classes of drivers, such as those convicted of driving while

intoxicated,24 must prove their ability to respond in damages to a
liability judgment resulting from future negligent operation of a
motor vehicle.? This proof may take the form of either a bond or a

liability insurance policy in a certain amount. 26 Any such policy is
certified according to the provisions of the statute and may not be

cancelled without notifying the appropriate authority within a
certain period before the effective date of cancellation

7

As these statutes provide for notice solely to the Commissioner
of Motor Vehicles or other appropriate authority and not to the
insured, the insurer is able to cancel for any reason it deems

adequate, subject only to the terms of the contract2" and any
statutory provisions extrinsic to the Financial Responsibility Law. 9

It is commonly stated that insurance contracts may not be
cancelled without the mutual consent of the parties unless they have
provided for cancellation in the contract,3 but the typical contract
21See. e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 8-739, 8-254 (1964); MD. ANN. CODE art. 66 1/2, §§ 118,
104 (1957). Other classes include drivers who have been involved in accidents causing
damages above a certain limit. See. e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 28.20.050 (1962); IOWA CODE
§ 321A.5 (1966); Ky. REV. STAT. § 187.330 (1962); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.5 (1965).
1See. e.g., CAL. VEHICLE CODE § 16020 (West 1960); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.1(11)
(Supp. 1967); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 335 (McKinney Supp. 1968).
2 See, e.g.. CAL. VEHICLE CODE §§ 16023, 16057, 16059 (West Supp. 1968); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 324.031 (1968); TEX. REV. CNv. STAT. ANN. art. 6701(h), § 18 (1960).
See IOWA CODE § 321A.22 (1966) (10 days); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 347 (McKinney
1960) (10 days); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.22 (1965) (20 days); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4509.5 (Page 1965) (10 days); TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 6701(h), § 22 (1960) (5
days).
11Florida seems to be the single exception to this pattern, as its Financial Responsibility
Law provides that the insurer is required to notify the insured as well as the Commissioner
of Motor Vehicles in advance of cancellation. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 324.181 (1968). Other
states have some rudimentary protection. Nebraska, for example, provides that liability
insurance policies which are to be issued in that state must contain a clause governing
cancellation in order to be approved for issuance by state authorities. NEB. REV. STAT. § 44379 (1960). See also N.D. CENT. CODE § 26-02-32 (Supp. 1967). Such a provision seems
clearly subject to the weaknesses noted in the text infra accompanying notes 30-34.
U For examples of states with both a Financial Responsibility Law and a statute regulating
cancellations, see KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 8-722, 40-276 (1968); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 20-279.1,
20-310 (Supp. 1967).
10E.g., Wright v. Columbia Cas. Co., 137 F. Supp. 775 (S.D. W. Va.), affd, 235 F.2d
462 (4th Cir. 1956); Trans-America Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 262 Ala. 532, 80 So. 2d 253 (1955);
Schnell v. United Hail Ins. Co., 145 Neb. 768, 18 N.W.2d 112 (1955) (crop insurance);
Slater v. Gen. Cas. Co., 344 Pi. 410, 25 A.2d 697 (1942).
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will generally prescribe some method of cancellation. Such clauses,

as part of standard contracts, are not subject to bargaining between
the parties, 3' and the allocation of risk on the issue of cancellation
is accomplished essentially by fiat of the insurer. Although strict
construction of insurance contract terms may offer an opportunity
for judicial mitigation of the rigors of a cancellation,32 the insured
party must still depend on the interpretation of the wording of the
contract clause by the court. Moreover, it would seem that the
insurer could avoid the effect of any strict construction of a
cancellation clause simply by redrafting the clause for future
contracts. Thus, policyholders must essentially depend on the selfrestraint of the insurer.P Although insurers themselves are aware of
the problem and have in some instances voluntarily restricted their

own ability to cancel, ' the possibility of arbitrary cancellation
remains real for much of the industry. Since states which have only
a Financial Responsibility Law to govern cancellation of
automobile liability policies *appear to be in the majority, it is fair
to conclude that absent legislation, most of the states offer little or
no protection against arbitrary cancellations.
11The extreme difference in bargaining power between insurance companies and individuals
suggests that in a particularly distressing case, equitable concepts of unconscionability might
be used to attack the enforcement of the cancellation clause. Professor Corbin suggests that
"'[t]here is sufficient flexibility in the concepts of fraud, duress, misrepresentation, and undue
influence, not to mention differences in economic bargaining power, to enable the courts to
avoid enforcement of a bargain that is shown to be unconscionable ....
" I A. CORBI
CONTRACTS § 128 (1963). See Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F,2d 445
(D.C. Cir. 1965); Steven v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 58 Cal. 2d 862, 377 P.2d 284 (1962).
The approach taken by courts in mitigation of the rigors of cancellation suggests that an
unconscionability attack in a proper case might be well received. See notes 39-44 infra and
accompanying text. However, since such cancellation clauses are not forbidden by law, see.
e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-310 (Supp. 1967). it would seem that the degree of
unconscionability would have to be egregious to stimulate court action. In addition, the
recent trend toward enactment of legislation regulating cancellation, see infra, would seem to
indicate that legislatures recognize that cancellation clauses are necessary elements of
insurance coverage and that the particular means of regulating the use of such clauses is a
subject better suited for legislation than the exercise of the equity powers of courts.
"See, e.g., Trans-America Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 262 Ala. 532, 80 So. 2d 253 (1955): Griffin
v. Gen. Accident Fire & Life Assurance Co., 94 Ohio App. 403, 116 N.E.2d 41 (1953);
Allied Concord Financial Corp. v. Sterling Ins. Co.,
S.C.
, 159 S.E.2d 919 (1968);
Anchor Cas. Co. v. Crisp, 346 S.W.2d 364 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961); Buffalo Ins. Co. v. Best,
312 S.W.2d 270 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958); Diamond T Utah, Inc. v. Canal Ins. Co., 12 Utah
2d 37, 361 P.2d 665 (1961).
" This is perhaps not a nugatory protection. See note 34 infra and accompanying text.
iearings,supra note 4, at 93, 103, 112, 117, 123.
H
= See note 22 supra.

Vol. 1969: 327]

A UTOMOBILE INSURANCE

STATUTES OFFERING PROCEDURAL PROTECTION

A number of states have provisions in addition to and separate
from their Financial Responsibility Law which govern the
cancellation of automobile liability insurance policies 6 This type of
statute generally provides that the insurer may not cancel without
mailing or delivering notice to the insured of its intent to cancel.
The notice, in a prescribed form, must be sent a certain period of
time in advance of the effective date of cancellation contained in
the notice 7 Statutes of this type do not affect the ability of the
insurer to cancel, but only prescribe the procedure which must be
followed in order to effectuate cancellation. As is the case where no
statute at all or only a Financial Responsibility Law is applicable,
these "procedural" statutes offer very little protection against
arbitrary cancellation, since advance notice of an arbitrary
cancellation does not seem to change its character. Although
arbitrary cancellation is still possible under "procedural" statutes,
it must be noted that these statutes have been enacted only for the
limited purpose of enabling the cancelled policyholder to receive
sufficient notice of the impending cancellation in order to obtain
8
other liability insurance and avoid a gap in coverage
However, judicial construction of the procedural statutes may
provide some degree of protection to the insured beyond the bare
notice of cancellation. Since such statutes are construed to
3
accomplish the legislature's purpose of providing some warning, 1
insurers will be required to comply strictly with the procedures
1See. e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 324.181 (1968) (included within the Financial Responsibility Law); IOWA CODE § 515.81 (Supp. 1969); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:636 (1959)
(Louisiana enacted a much more restrictive statute in 1968. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 22:636.1 (Supp. 1969)); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 1051 (1964); MD. ANN. CODE art.
48A, §§ 240A, 240B (1957); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 24.13020 (1957) (Michigan also has a more
restrictive statute in addition to the notice statute. See MICH. STAT. ANN. § 24.13220 (Supp.
1969)); N.D. CE-NT. CODE § 26-02-33 (Supp. 1967): '%A. Co': ANN. § 38.1-70.9 (Supp.
1968).
3,See. e.g., IOWA CODE § 515.81 (Supp. 1969); VA. CODE ANN. § 38.1-70.9 (Supp. 1968).
1See Am. Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Knox, 164 F. Supp. 3 (W.D. La. 1958); Levinson v.
Travelers Indem. Co., 258 N.C. 672, 129 S.E.2d 297 (1963). See also Merrimack Mut. Fire
Ins. Co. v. Scott, 219 Ark. 159, 240 S.W.2d 666 (1951); Cantrell v. Benefit Ass'n of Ry.
Employees, 136 Mont. 426, 348 P.2d 345 (1959); Poch v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y,
343 Pa. 119, 22 A.2d 590 (1941); State Auto Mut. Ins. Co. v. Lloyd, 54 Tenn. App. 587,
607, 393 S.W.2d 17, 26 (1965); Buffalo Ins. Co. v. Best, 312 S.W.2d 270 (Tex. Civ. App.
1958).
33Id.
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contained therein0 Such compliance is required even though the
insured may have received notice which comports with the basic
purpose of the statute and which, in fact, was sufficient to inform
him that his insurance was being cancelled. Other "procedural"
matters, such as whether actual receipt of notice of cancellation" or
tender of unearned premiums 4 3 *are required to effectuate
cancellation, may also be used to extend the protection of the
statute. Should such requirements result from judicial construction,
usual canons of insurance contract interpretation would apply, and
the insurer would be required to follow the same procedure for
future cancellations of similar contracts' However, it seems that
insurers: can meet any new requirements that result from judicial
construction by redrafting their contracts, and will continue to be
able to cancel other policies in the future with little difficulty.
The significance of a protective judicial construction is much
greater for an individual litigant since the insurer is forced to
indemnify the insured as a iesult of the decision. The value of such
a construction may be observed in Selken v. Northland Insurance
"See, e.g., Clark v. Employers Mut. Cas. Co., 90 F.2d 667 (8th Cir. 1937); Sanks v. St.
Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 131 Neb. 266, 267 N.W. 454 (1936) (see also NEB. REv. STAT.
§ 44-379 (1960)); Virginia Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Saccio, 204 Va. 769, 133 S.E.2d
268 (1963). See also Lewis Mach. Co. v. Aztec Lines, 172 F.2d 746 (7th Cir. 1949)
(Interstate Commerce Act, 15 U.S.C. § 315 (1964)); Trans-America Ins. Co. 'v. Wilson, 262
Ala. 532, 80 So. 2d 253 (1955) (policy provisions).
41Crisp v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 256 N.C. 408, 124 S.E.2d 149 (1962). In
Perkins v. Am. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 274 N.C. 134, 161 S.E.2d 536 (1968), the insured had
not had the opportunity to read the notice, which seemingly would not have changed the
result since the notice did not accord with the statutory requirements. In other cases,
involving policy terms rather than statutes, similar results have obtained despite facts which
at least raise a suspicion that the insured actually knew of the cancellation. E.g., Traders &
Gen. Ins. Co. v. Champ, 225 F.2d 802 (9th Cir. 195'), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 958 (1956);
Burnett v. Illinois Agricultural Mut. Ins. Co., 318 Ill. App. 629, 48 N.E.2d 559 (1943).
"See, e.g.. DeHaan v. Marvin, 331 Mich. 231, 49 N.W.2d 148 (1951); Galkin v. Lincoln
Mut. Cas. Co., 279 Mich. 327, 272 N.W. 694 (1937). See also Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Taylor,
193 F.2d 756, 759 (10th Cir. 1952). See generally Annot., 64 A.L.R.2d 982 (1959).
"See. e.g.. Riverside Ins. Co. v. Parker, 237 Ark. 594, 375 SW.2d 225 (1964); ElIzey v.
Hardware Mut. Ins. Co., 40 So. 2d 24 (La. App. 1949); Barr ex relSenft v. Country Mut.
Cas. Co., 345 Ill.
App. 199, 102 N.E.2d 656 (1951). See generally Annot., 127 A.L.R. 1341
(1940).
" For expressions of such canons of construction, see, e.g., Wright v. Columbia Cas. Co.,
137 F. Supp. 775 (S.D. W. Va.), affd, 235 F.2d 462 (4th Cir. 1956); Trans-America Ins.
Co. v. Wilson, 262 Ala. 532, 80 So. 2d 253 (1955); Farmers Mut. Hail Ins. Co. v. Minton,
279 S.W.2d 523 (Mo. App. 1955) (insurer recovered assessment despite efforts by insured to
cancel policy).
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Co.,45 where the Iowa Supreme Court dealt with the statute
governing the cancellation of insurance policies "other than life,"
which stated that "[t]he policy may be cancelled by the insurance
company by giving five days notice of such cancellation . . . . '
In accordance with the policy provision, the insurer had mailed a
ten day notice to the insured at his home town address, but the
insured lived and worked in another town and apparently never
received the notice. The Iowa court interpreted "giving" as
meaning "to deliver to another" and found a legislative intent that
actual receipt of notice by the insured was required to effectuate
cancellation, despite the fact that any such intent seemed absent
from the face of the statute and no legislative history or other
authority was cited in support of the finding.4 7 Similar results have
been reached under other state statutes where notice was not
received because the insured lived at a different address than that
shown in the policy.4 In one case, the insurer's agent's knowledge
of a changed address was automatically imputed to the insurer
without consideration of the particular facts of the agency
relationship or of usual agency principles commonly required for
imputing an agent's knowledge to the principal 9 Such decisions,
while defensible under the facts and statutes involved, may
represent a judicial feeling that the "procedural" statutes offer
inadequate protection against arbitrary cancellation and hence must
be construed in a fashion most favorable to the insured party in
order to protect both the insured and potential victims of traffic
accidents who might sue the cancelled party.
STATUTES GOVERNING ABILITY TO CANCEL-INITIAL ATTEMPTS

Statutes of a second group designed to restrict the ability of
insurers to cancel not only provide procedures which the insurer
must follow, but also estabiish the exclusive reasons for which the
249 Iowa 1046, 90 N.W.2d 29 (1958).
Cou: § 515.81 (1949).
'7 249 Iowa at 1053, 90 N.W.2d at 33.
'See. e.g., Skipper v. Fed. Ins. Co., 238 La. 779, 116 So. 2d 520 (1959); Breitenbach v.
Green, 186 So. 2d 712 (La. App. 1966). See also Merrimack Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Scott, 219
Ark. 159, 240 S.W.2d 666 (1951); Griffin v. Gen. Accident Fire& Life Assurance Co., 94 Ohio
App. 403. 116 N.E.2d 41 (1953).
" Skipper v. Fed. Ins. Co., 238 La. 779, 116 So. 2d 520 (1959).
'

"IOWA
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insurer may cancel.5 0 These statutes (hereinafter referred to as
Group II statutes) typically provide that before an insurer may

cancel a policy which has been in effect for more than sixty days, a
prescribed form of notice must be given to the insured and to the
Department of Motor Vehicles at least fifteen days in advance of
the effective date of cancellation. Furthermore, the notice must

specify the statutorily authorized reason for which the insurer is
cancelling 5 Generally, Group II statutes restrict the reasons for
cancellation to: non-payment of premium by the insured; violation
of any term or condition of the policy by the insured; revocation or
suspension of the driver's license of the insured or any other
-customary operator of the insured vehicle; development of a
tendency to heart attacks or epilepsy by the insured; and conviction
of the insured for certain specified offenses5
Some Group II statutes attempt to avoid the highly litigated
areas of receipt of notice and tender of unearned premiums as
prerequisities to cancellation by providing that mailing of the notice
by registered mail is sufficient proof of notice 53 and that tender of
unearned premiums may be made after cancellation. 4 While these
requirements have been utilized to mitigate the hardships of
cancellation, 55 the enactment of exclusive, specified reasons for

cancellation arguably renders such judicial devices unnecessary.
However, assuming protection of the insured to be the purpose

5 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.0852 (Supp. 1969); GA. CODE ANN. § 56-2430 (Supp. 1968);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 73, § 755 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1969): KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-276 to 281
(Supp. 1968); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 24.13220-60 (Supp. 1969); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 72A.141-148 (1968); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-309 to 310 (1965); S.C. CODE ANN. § 46750.51 (1968); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 48.18.294 (Supp. 1968). Massachusetts is
arbitrarily inserted at this point as the statute defies characterization under the scheme of
this comment. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 175, § 113A (1959). It seems to be basically a
notice statute but there is an elaborate administrative appeal structure available to the
insured who may appeal on the grounds that the cancellation was invalid or improper and
unreasonable or both, ch. 175, § 113D.
11E.g., MICH. STAT. ANN. § 24.13224(3) (Supp. 1969); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-309(e), 310
(1965).
52 E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 73, § 755.3 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1969); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40.
277 (Supp. 1968); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-310(b) (1965).
" ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 73, § 755.6 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1969); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 72A.145 (1968); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-310(a) (1965).
" GA. CODE ANN. § 56-2430 (Supp. 1968). If such issues are not dealt with specifically, it
would seem that they retain viability despite enactment of a cancellation statute. See Griffin
v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 264 N.C. 212, 141 S.E.2d 300 (1965).
"See notes 45-49 supra and accompanying text.
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of the Group II statutes, the wide latitude created by the number of

permissible reasons for cancellation would seem to interfere with its
realization. The reasons for Which an insurance policy may be
cancelled are broad enough to include any occurrence which could
increase the risk to the insurer as well as some which seem
unrelated to any such change.58 Thus, the insured may be less

adequately protected under Group II statutes since the insurer
retains the ability to cancel for reasons which may not reflect an

increased risk and the traditional judicial tools for mitigating

5 7
excessively harsh results have been excluded by the statutes
Litigation under Group II statutes may indicate that such a

reading-of these statutes is not implausible. Despite the provisions
outlining exclusive, specified reasons for cancellation in Group II

statutes, there apparently has been no litigation involving the
sufficiency of any insurer's reason for cancellingg Since litigation
under these statutes has been exclusively concerned with
procedural aspects, there has been limited impact outside of the
"procedural" area.59 However, there is an important difference
between the Group II and "procedural" statutes. The statutes
which restrict the insurer's ability to cancel to exclusive, specified

situations evidence on their face a broader legislative concern than
simply providing time for the cancelled party to obtain new

insurance. Such a broader legislative purpose could enable a court
"6Several Group II statutes provide that conviction of a felony is a suitable ground for

cancellation. E.g., N.C.

GEN. STAT.

§ 20-310(b) (1965);

WASH. REV. CODE ANN.

§ 48.18.294 (Supp. 1968). Yet, there would seem to be nothing inherent in embezzlement, for
example, which would render an embezzler an increased risk to the insurer. It is of course
possible that felons as a class are much worse risks, in which case the provision is justifiable.
Compare MINN. STAT. ANN. § 72A.142 (1968) which lacks any such provision. Insurers
maintain that statistical analysis reveals certain occupations such as bartenders, waitresses,
and musicians, and other groups such as divorced or separated people'present a degree of
risk which merits cancellation. Each company has a slightly different group of statistical
"bad risks" which change from time to time since the insurers use 625 different factors in
their evaluation. Interview with Alexander Popoff, De Frates Insurance Agency, in
Philadelphia, Pa., March 29, 1969. The statute does not deal and should not deal with the
underlying reasons in such detail. Assuming that insurers are able to charge a premium
which accurately reflects the risk involved, they should not be able to cancel for any
variation in the risk but rather should elevate some of these factors into the "term or
condition of the policy" rubric if cancellation is in fact mandated by risk figures.
5 See notes 53-54 supra and accompanying text.
" At least no cases have been found adjudicating the sufficiency of an asserted statutory
reason for cancellation.
41See notes 45-49 supra and accompanying text.
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which applies a Group I I statute to do so with a less constricted
approach than is the case with the limited purpose "procedural"
statute, even though the issues involved in litigation tend to be
similar under both types of statute. 0 One Group II statute, in effect
in North Carolina, requires that the cancellation notice contain a
"statement that financial responsibility is required to be maintained
continously throughout the registration period and that operation
of a motor vehicle without maintaining such financial responsibility
is a misdemeanor .... ." Although there could be little doubt
that a cancellation notice lacking such a statement would still
apprise the insured of the status of his policy, the North Carolina
Supreme Court has held that lack of such statement renders
cancellation ineffective. 2 The court stated that the legislature
intended the required notice to be a "firm reminder . . . of the
law" and hence such notice was not a mere formality." The same
court, construing the same statute in a different factual situation,
adopted a still broader protective interpretation. 4 In this case, the
insurer had attempted to cancel a non-certified assigned risk policy,
giving fifteen days notice to the insured, apparently in reliance on
statutory language to the effect that the cancellation provisions
were not applicable to assigned risk policies. Despite such language,
the court reasoned that the legislature could not have intended to
grant insurers a broader right to cancel assigned risk policies than
other policies." Noting that an earlier Financial Responsibility
Law was incorporated by reference into the later act,66 the court
applied the cancellation provisions of the earlier enacted law, and
since these provided strict requirements for cancellation of a
certified assigned risk policy, the cancellation of the non-certified
policy was also held ineffective.6" Absent the presence of the general
'o Compare Harrelson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 272 N.C. 603, 158 S.E.2d 812
(1968) with Breitenbach v. Green, 186 So. 2d 712 (La. App. 1966).
"2N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-310(a) (1965).
Crisp v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 256 N.C. 408, 124 S.E.2d 149 (1962).
I1d. at 414, 124 S.E.2d at 154.
"Harrelson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 272 N.C. 603, 158 S.E.2d 812 (1968).
"Id. at 611, 158 S.E.2d at 818.
"Id. at 610, 158 S.E.2d at 818.

Id. at 612, 158 S.E.2d at 819. Such a broad application of the statute was apparently in
response to the problem presented by the facts of the case and the statutory language. It is
doubtful that the legislature actually intended non-'certified assigned risk policies to be more
easily cancelable than other policies, since the non-certified assigned risk policy is issued to
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protective intent behind the Group II type statute it is questionable
whether the court could have reached this conclusion.

Furthermore, since all the major potential changes in the
insurance risk are available under Group II type statutes and the
troublesome areas of receipt of notice and tender of unearned

premium are settled by the statutes in the insurers' favor,

8

it may

be argued that the statutes actually protect not the policyholder but

the insurer. Thus, it seems reasonable to conclude that the insurer
would not be likely to precipitate a law suit by using an

unapproved reason for cancellation. Also, since the statutes
generally allow cancellation when there is a change in the insurance
risk and since the approved reasons for cancellation are based on
facts subject to ready verification, there is no economic incentive
foi insurers to cancel on other than permissible grounds nor a great

possibility for mistake as to the facts. Probably for both of these
reasons, there are apparently no cases litigating the sufficiency of

asserted grounds for cancellation under Group II statutes. "9 Since
Group II statutes generally restrict the available grounds for
cancellation to legitimate changes in the insurance risk,70 however,
enable the motor vehicle owner to comply with the compulsory insurance requirements of the
Vehicle Financial Responsibility Act. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 20-309 and 20-314 (1965).
Certified assigned risk policies are issued pursuant to the Safety and Responsibility Act,
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 20-279.1 and 20-279.34 (Supp. 1967) which establishes requirements for
certain classes of drivers. See note 24 supra and accompanying text.
The legislature, however, did not deal specifically with non-certified assigned risk policies
as it had with certified assigned risks in the earlier statute. Having given specific treatment to
the certified assigned risk, the legislature's failure to treat specifically the non-certified
assigned risk arguably demonstrated a legislative intent for a lesser degree of protection for
non-certified policies. Such an interpretation, however runs counter to the policy behind
assigned risk plans of enabling drivers to obtain and keep liability insurance in order to
protect the public from insolvent high risk drivers when insurers would not ordinarily insure.
See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.34 (Supp. 1967); Jones v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
270 N.C. 454, 460, 155 S.E.2d 118, 123 (1967). Thus, on balance, the problem with the noncertified assigned risk appears to have arisen from legislative inadvertence rather than by
design. The court did not advert to any such analysis, however, and shied away from the
logical implication of its holding by noting that it refused to decide whether non-certified
assigned risks became in legal effect the same as certified assigned risks. Yet, from the
reasoning employed and the result obtained, the court in effect determined that at least for
the purpose of cancellation the two will be treated identically.
See notes 52-55 supra and accompanying text.
"oSome explanation of this phenomenon must be attempted despite the number of
competing inferences which may be drawn from the absence of cases. For a more realistic
explanation see note 82 infra and accompanying text.
10See notes 52-55 supra and accompanying text.
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they do effectively proscribe purely arbitrary cancellations.
Furthermore, the inference that Group II statutes have been
effective in preventing arbitrary cancellations, without being
burdensome to insurers, seems to have support beyond the mere
absence of cases litigating sufficiency of reasons for cancellation.
The major mutual and stock companies had experience with this
type of statute prior to their 1962 decision71 to limit their
72
cancellations to those reasons specified in Group II statutes.
Arguably, this experience convinced the insurers that the statutes
benefited the public while not unduly prejudicing their own
financial operations. These same companies not only adopted such
restrictions themselves, but also pressed other state legislatures to
enact them into law 3
STATUTES GOVERNING ABILITY TO CANCEL-LATEST EFFORTS

Although the notice and Group II statutes have provided some
improvements the problems" of cancellation apparently remained in
1968 when the major insurance companies further voluntarily
restricted their cancellations to two situations: where the insured
has his driver's license suspended or revoked by the state, and where
the insured has failed to pay the'premium due on the contract.,
Again, the insurers have urged legislative adoption of these
standards by all states.75 Although it is still too early to determine
whether there is a trend toward such restrictive legislation, several
important jurisdictions have adopted statutes similar to the
recommended one.76 The statutes (hereinafter referred to as Group
7, E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-310 (1965) (enacted by ch. 1393, § 2, [1957], Session Laws
of North Carolina 1586).
n Hearings,supra note 4, at 103, 112, 117, 123. The insurers who took this voluntary step

were the major insurance writers such as Aetna Life & Casualty Co. and the approximately
130 other members of the Insurance Rating Board and the Mutual Insurance Rating Bureau.

Letter from Mr. Robert W. Rahn, Division Research Attorney, Underwriting Research &
Development Division, Aetna Life & Casualty Co. to Duke Law Journal, Mar. 13, 1969.
7 Hearings, supra note 4, at 93-94, 103, 118; Letter from Bob Moretti (Assemblyman,
California Legislature) to the Duke Law Journal, Nov. 7, 1968 ("progressive" insurers
supported CAL. INS. CODE § 661 (West Supp. 1968)).
74Hearings, supra note 4, at 103, 112, 117, 123.

n Id.; Letter from Bob Moretti (Assemblyman, California Legislature) to the Duke Law
Journal,Nov. 7, 1,968.
? CAL. INS. CODE §§ 660-69 (Vest Supp. 1968); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:636.1 (Supp.
1969); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 17:29C-1 to 29C-13 (Supp. 1968); N.Y. INS. LAW
(McKinney Supp. 1968); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40 §§ 1008.1-.11(1969).

§

167a
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II I statutes) are quite similar, most requiring twenty days notice of
any proposed non-renewal or cancellation on the two permissible

grounds.' The major difference among the statutes appears to be
the treatment accorded policy coverages other than liability, such

as theft or collision. California and New Jersey allow the insurer to
modify the policy only to the extent of inserting a one hundred
dollar deductible feature without having to fulfill the statutory

requirements for a cancellation. 78 New York, in contrast,
apparently allows the insurer to make major modifications of the
policy even to the extent of cancelling these other coverages without
complying with the statutory requirements for grounds of

cancellation! 9 It is interesting to note that the insurers supported
the California position, ° which seems on its face to be more clearly
concerned with the welfare of the insured than is the New York
statute 1
It will be some time before the first cases arise under these

statutes, but certain elements of such cases should follow
predictable lines. Primarily, and very likely exclusively, the cases
will involve the procedural aspects of the statutes rather than the

substantive reasons available for cancellation. The approved
grounds for cancellation under these statutes are definite, and if

there has been no litigation involving the more complex reasons in
" CAL. INS. CODE § 662 (West Supp. 1968); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:636.1c (Supp.
1969); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:29C-8 (Supp. 1968); N.Y. INS. LAW § 167a3 (MqKinney Supp.
1968). Pennsylvania requires thirty days notice. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1008.5 (Supp.
1969). New York requires forty-five days notice of intention not to renew. N.Y. INS. LAW
§ 167a4 (McKinney Supp. 1968).
78CAL. INS. CODE § 66 1(c) (West Supp. 1968); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:29C-7(C) (Supp.
1968).
71N.Y. INS. LAW § 167a3 (McKinney Supp. 1968). Louisiana and Pennsylvania have no
such exception in their statutes. See note 77 supra.
" See notes 73 and 74 supra and accompanying text. Insurers support such legislation in
spite of the fact that arbitrary cancellations have not occurred in substantial numbers. They
feel that the statutes are in the public interest and protect the competitive position of the insurers by binding all insurance companies. In addition, some insurers are concerned with any
practice which adversely affects the reputation of the industry. Letter from Mr. Robert W.
Rahn, Division Research Attorney, Underwriting Research & Development Division, Aetna
Life& Casualty Co. to the Duke Law Journal, Mar. 13, 1969.
SI The New York statute appears to be more concerned with the liability insurance portion
of a comprehensive liability policy. Thus, it seems that the strongest motive behind the
statute is not consumer protection, as Governor Rockefeller has stated, see 1968
McKINNEY'S SESSION LAW'NEws A-190, but rather the more traditional one of protecting
the solvency of prospective defenidants.
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the Group II statutes, then these Group IllI statutes should
virtually foreclose the prospect of such litigation.
Where the clarity and succinctness of the reasons for
cancellation under Group III statutes will tend to discourage
litigation on the sufficiency of an asserted ground, there is a more
realistic explanation for the predictable absence of litigated cases.
Both Group II and Group III statutes are applicable only to
policies which have been in effect for more than.sixty days.82 Thus
during the first sixty days of a policy, the insurer may cancel for
any reason it deems adequate or for no reason at all. This feature
of the statutes seems to result from the fact that insurance is sold
in response to public demand rather than to a conscious marketing
decision on the part of insurers s3 Generally, new, as opposed to
renewal, contracts of automobile liability insurance are concluded
in connection with the purchase of an automobile. The buyer with
any knowledge of liability hazards is required by common sense, or
in some cases by state lawv, 4 to buy liability insurance before
driving his new car. In response to the resultant demand for rapid
coverage, insurers provide coverage for the driver from the time
that the insurance application is completed and the initial premium
paid. The insurer must then investigate the application while facing
the chance of loss on a possibly unprofitable risk contractYi The
sixty-day limitation before the statutes become applicable may be
read as a legislative concession to the industry's marketing practice
which, however, is regulated by a reasonable time limit.
Under Group III statutes there is a stronger argument to
support such a time limit than is available under Group II statutes.
Under Group III statutes, the insurer may cancel for two reasons
only after the sixty-day period, and it seems fair to allow the
insurer the opportunity to investigate and reject the high risk
drivers before the insurer is irrevocably bound. Under Group 11
statutes, however, the reasons available for cancellation during the
Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-310 (1965) with CAL. INS. CODE § 661(b) (West Supp.
1968).
See Jensen v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 52 Cal. 2d 786, 798, 345 P.2d 1, 7 (1959).
"MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 175, §§ I13A-I 13L (Supp. 1968); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW
§§ 310 -21 (McKinney 1960); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-309 (1965).
85E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 2904(f)(1) (1953); HAWAII REV. LAWS § 160-107(a)
(1955); IOWA CODE § 321A.21(6)(a) (1966); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(0(1) (Supp.

1967).
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entire term of the policy seem broad enough to include any
legitimate change in the insurance risk revealed by the insurer's
investigation. Thus, the Group II statutes do not seem to be so
restrictive as to provide sufficient justification for delaying the
applicability of the cancellation statute.
Once the sixty-day period has passed and the cancellation
statute is applicable, non-renewal of the policy becomes the major
area of potential arbitrary action. There is some indication that
insurers have shifted away from cancellation to non-renewals as the
major method of weeding "out unacceptable risks."5 Unfortunately,
neither Group II nor Group III statutes address themselves to the
substantive issues involved in non-renewals. Generally, all that is
necessary to accomplish a non-renewal under either type of statute is
to provide the insured party with a certain period of advance notice
that the insurer intends not to renew the policy, that the reasons for
which the action is being taken will be supplied upon request, that
the insured may make such a request within a certain period after
the effective date of the notice and that the assigned risk plan is
available 7 It seems obvious from the language of the statutes that
the insurer could choose not to renew for any reason it deemed
sufficient. However, as is the case with the sixty-day cancellation
period, the non-renewal device should not receive blanket
condemnation. The experience during the past few years of a large
number of high risk insurance carriers becoming insolvent 8 points
out the danger of requiring a company to insure large numbers of
high risk drivers. These drivers have available to them the assigned
risk plans which are part of Financial Responsibility Laws enacted
in virtually all states," if the insurer fails to renew their policy. The
assigned risk plans theoretically allocate the high risk drivers
equitably among the insurers and avoid concentrating such risks in
any single company.9

F

CRISIS IN CAR INSURANCE 264 (R. Keeton, J. O'Connell & J. McCord, ed. 1968).
E.g., CAL. INS. CODE § 663 (West Supp. 1968); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-310(c) (1965).
Hearings, supra note 4, at 12, 15, 37, 72; CRISIS IN CAR INSURANCE 255 (R. Keeton, J.

O'Connell & J. McCord. ed. 1968).
" For a complete listing of Financial Responsibility Laws, see Loiseaux, Innocent Victims
1959, 38 TEx. L. REV. 154, 157 (1959). See generally Legislation, A Survey oJ Financial
Responsibility Laws and Compensation of Traffic Victims: A Proposal for Rejbrm, 21
VAND. L. REV. 1058 (1968).
" E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.34 (Supp. 1967). See also Jones v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 270 N.C. 454, 155 S.E.2d 118 (1967).
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On the basis of the foregoing analysis, it appears that the sixtyday waiting period before cancellation statutes become applicable
and the non-renewal device are the major opportunities for
"arbitrary action by insurers under either Group II or Group IIl
statutes. Assuming that the fault liability system will continuep, and
that it is desirable to restrict the insurers' ability to cancel policies
in order to ensure that the largest possible number of drivers are
covered by liability insurance, it would seem that any statute which
attempts to restrict cancellations must address not only the
substantive reasons for cancellation, as in the Group II and Group
III statutes, but also must deal with the sixty-day time limit and
with non-renewals.
Several alternative approaches may be suggested. First, it would
seem possible to dispense with the sixty-day time period or any
shorter period and retain the limited cancellation provisions of
either Group II or Group III statutes. This would have the effect of
requiring the insurer as h practical matter to investigate the
applicant before issuing a policy, particularly in Group III statute
cases. However, it would seem that such a solution would run afoul
of the public demand for rapid insurance coverage and would
probably be unacceptable for that reason. As to Group II statutes,
though, the situation is somewhat different. As noted earlier, those
statutes seem to contain all legitimate changes in the risk to the
insurer as grounds for cancellation.12 Thus, if the time period before
the statute becomes applicable were removed, all arbitrary
cancellations would be proscribed, yet the insurer could still
investigate and cancel the policy in the event the actual risk was
not correctly represented in the policy application.13 The fact that
the insurer would bear the risk of loss would provide adequate
incentive for an early resolution of the investigatory efforts,
probably within the present sixty-day time limit. Thus, it would
seem that as to Group II statutes, the sixty-day time period is not
only a major loophole for potential misuse by insurers, but is also
superfluous, so far as the economic needs of insurers are concerned.
For the most publicized alternative suggestion, see R. KEErON &. J. O'CONNELL, BASIC
VICTIM (1965).
2 See notes 52-55 supra and accompanying text.
13E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-310(b) (2) (1965) provides as a ground for cancellation the
fact that "[t]he insured violates any of the terms and conditions of the policy . . . .." Fraud
"1

PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC
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A second alternative approach would be to dispense with the
sixty-day period, require the insurer to carry everyone whose
application is accepted initially, but allow the insurer to refuse to
renew. However, the insurer would again be forced to investigate
the risk in advance of coverage or be subject to substantial
financial loss, and that approach is thus subject to the same
weakness noted above. In addition, such a plan would be unduly
restrictive on the insurer since the insurance risk of any particular
driver may change and become so great that the insurer should be
able to cancel. Of course, Group III statutes are to some degree
also subject to this criticism.
A third approach to the sixty-day time period would be to
dispense with the period, forbid cancellations, but allow the insurer
to charge a premium commensurate with the true insurance risk as
soon as investigation reveals that the risk is not correctly
represented in the application. Should the insured be unwilling to
pay the higher premium, he would have the option of cancelling the
policy himself or of being transferred to the assigned risk plan. As
additional protection against a gap in coverage, the insurer in this
circumstance could be required to bear the risk until the risk was
assigned by the state authority. Under this approach, the insurer
could investigate at his leisure, under the incentive of bearing the
risk of loss, yet could avoid high risk losses by charging a premium
appropriate to the risk 4
The approach to the problem of non-renewal depends largely on
the manner in which the sixty-day period is handled and must also
be addressed if the goal of preventing arbitrary action is to be
accomplished. At a minimum, any statute attempting to solve the
problem should proscribe non-renewals which are not based on a
significant change in the risk created by the insured. Whether this
should be accomplished by a statute in general terms or by a
specific list of approved reasons for non-renewal must be a
legislative decision, but some observations may be offered as to
that decision. If the statute is a Group II statute, listing all the
or mistake in the application for the policy should be clearly included in such language or
would quickly become included by appropriate policy language.

" This assumes that the insurer would be permitted to set a premium which accurately
reflected the risk involved rather than have a state agency control the premium except for the
assigned risk.
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legitimate changes in the insurance risk as grounds for cancellation,
then restricting the insurer to those reasons for non-renewals as
well would seem neither overly restrictive nor harsh, since the
functions of cancellation and non-renewal are essentially identical.
Group III statutes present a different problem since the available

reasons for cancellation are greatly limited. Were insurers restricted
to those reasons for non-renewal as well as for cancellation, it
would be possible for a group of once insured high risk drivers who

pay their premiums and manage to avoid having their driver's
licenses suspended or revoked to become concentrated in a few

companies. In order to avoid such a possibility, the insurer under
Group III statutes should be allowed somewhat greater latitude in
refusing to renew than is presently available in cancellation. 5
Perhaps an alternative could be to forbid non-renewal except for
Group III statutory grounds, but to permit the insurer to increase
premiums commensurate with the risk up to the assigned risk rate.
Other suggestions may be propounded to close the loopholes in

the statutes that result from the sixty-day period and the
unrestricted ability to refuse to renew." However, it would seem
that the fairest method suggested among those noted above would
be a modified Group II statute. Limiting cancellations to a
complete list of potential changes in the insurance risk without
waiting sixty days for the statute to apply seems neither harsh nor
inequitable. Furthermore, limiting the substantive grounds for non's It is pure speculation, but perhaps true, that insurers support Group III statutes on the
tacit understanding that the unrestricted non-renewal and the sixty day "grace period" for
the insurer will remain in the statute. It seems unlikely that insurers would support such
restrictions on non-renewal as well as cancellation.
9 Methods of enforcing cancellation statutes follow one of two variations. The traditional
approach seems to be a suit by the cancelled policyholder against the insurer after a judgment
has been entered against the insured in a separate action. The second pattern, exemplified by
Massachusetts, is to provide some administrative structure to determine the validity of
cancellations after an appeal by the insured.
The traditional approach leaves the policyholder in a difficult position. He must win in a
suit against the insurer or be faced with satisfying a judgment. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20310 (1965) (no enforcement procedure); Perkins v. Am. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 274 N.C. 134,
161 S.E.2d 536 (1968). While a suit for declaratory judgment offers a possible method of
resolving the controversy in advance of any accident and judgment against the insured, the
policyholder would still be forced into the courts with the attendant delay, evidentiary
difficulties and.expense.
Massachusetts, in contrast, provides for an appeal board made up of representatives of the
Attorney General, the Insurance Commissioner, and the Registrar of Motor Vehicles. MAss.
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renewals to the same reasons as are available for cancellation
would seem to be a logical extension of the original protection
given against arbitrary cancellation. Such a modified statute would
meet the market demand for rapid coverage yet allow the insurer to
cancel if the risk changes too greatly or is inaccurately represented

in the application, while at the same time precluding arbitrary
action. It is also possible that if a sufficient number of states adopt

such an approach to cancellations, the actual or apparent need for
federal regulation would diminish considerably.

GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 26, § 8A (1958). The insured may appeal any refusal to insure or any

cancellation to that board and has further recourse to the courts in the event of an adverse
determination. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 175, § 113D (1958). Apparently, the insured has
an excellent chance of winning his appeal to the board. See R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL,
BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM 78-81 (1965).
A number of the recent statutes appear to follow the Massachusetts example and provide
for some administrative determination of the validity of cancellations. E.g., KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 40-281 (Supp. 1968); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §§ 1008.8, 1008.9 (Supp. 1969).
California has taken a different approach by providing that willful violation of the nonrenewal (but not cancellation) provisions of the statute is a misdemeanor punishable by a fine
not in excess of five hundred dollars ($500.00). CAL. INS. CODE § 669 (West Supp. 1968).
In view of the difficult position of the policyholder under the traditional approach and the
apparent success of the Massachusetts procedure, it would seem that some variation of that
procedure providing an administrative appellate structure to test the validity of cancellations
is the best approach for enforcement procedures in any cancellation statute.

